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1 Introduction
In several OECD countries public finances deteriorated rapidly after the oil shocks of 1973
and 1982. Under the pressure of budget deficits on the order of 8 percent of GDP and bal-
looning public debts, a number of countries undertook large fiscal adjustments. Interestingly,
economic expansions rather than recessions accompanied fiscal consolidations in Denmark
and Ireland, while the large fiscal expansion in Sweden in the early nineties was followed by a
severe recession. At the same time, the fiscal adjustments in Denmark and Ireland proved to
have long-lasting effects on public finances: Ireland brought its public debt from 80 percent
of GDP in the early eighties to 40 percent of GDP in 2000; Danish public debt went from
50 to 30 percent of GDP over the same time period.
These phenomena renewed economists’ interest in the macroeconomic effects of fiscal
adjustments and raised a brand new question: What makes a fiscal adjustment successful in
the sense of having a lasting effect on public finances? Traditional Keynesian theory of fiscal
policy finds itself at odds with expansionary fiscal consolidations. Modern theories based
on representative agent models may be consistent with expansionary fiscal adjustments, but
they have little to say about what makes a fiscal adjustment successful.
The literature on successful fiscal adjustments points to a number of determinants of
success. Giavazzi and Pagano (1990, 1996) argue that the size of the fiscal adjustment,
namely the reduction in the deficit-to-GDP ratio, is important in raising the probability
of success. Alesina and Perotti (1995), Alesina and Ardagna (1998) and Alesina et al.
(1998) suggest that the composition of the fiscal adjustment, namely how much of the deficit
reduction stems from spending cuts rather than tax increases, is fundamental for success.
Perotti (1999) and Giavazzi et al. (2000) identify the level of public debt at the time of the
adjustment as a determinant of success, with higher public debt being more likely to make
a fiscal adjustment successful.
The role of monetary and exchange rate policies during episodes of fiscal adjustments
has not received similar attention. Most episodes of successful fiscal adjustments, however,
have been preceded by large exchange rate depreciations or devaluations. Earlier articles
recognize that devaluations may be important in making a fiscal consolidation successful -
see Giavazzi and Pagano (1990) and Alesina and Perotti (1997) - but the role of exchange
rate and monetary policies has never been explicitly investigated before.1
The goal of this paper is to assess the empirical role of monetary and exchange rate
policies on the success of fiscal adjustments. It adds to the literature on fiscal adjustments
in two ways. First, it characterizes the behavior of monetary and exchange rate policy before,
during and after fiscal adjustments using formal statistical analysis. By examining successful
and unsuccessful adjustments, we highlight the possible contribution of these policies for
success. Second, the paper tests an empirical model that explains the persistence of fiscal
adjustments by a combination of monetary and exchange rate policy and all other factors
1After completing this paper, we came across Hjelm (2000), who studies the issue of exchange rate
devaluations before fiscal adjustments and obtains results consistent with our findings. While this author
studies the response in terms of output growth, our focus is on the persistence of the adjustment.
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that have been previously studied in the literature.
Our results can be summarized as follows. Exchange rate depreciations in the two years
before a fiscal adjustment is initiated significantly increase the probability it will be suc-
cessful. In a joint regression, a one standard-deviation increase in rate of depreciation of
the nominal effective exchange rate in the two years before a fiscal adjustment increases the
probability of success by 2 percentage points. The size and composition of the deficit cut,
namely the spending-tax revenues composition of the fiscal adjustment, are also significant:
a one standard-deviation increase raises the probability of success by 4 and 3 percentage
points, respectively. Monetary policy, on the other hand, is found to have an insignificant
role in facilitating persistence in fiscal consolidations.
These results have important implications for the feasibility of fiscal consolidations in the
Economic and Monetary Union of Europe (EMU). Since the ability to devalue the exchange
rate helps in bringing a fiscal adjustment to a successful end, fiscal adjustments in the EMU
are less likely to be successful. This is due to the adoption of a common European currency,
denying any EMU member state the possibility of devaluing its own currency against that
of its most important trading partners (the other EMU members) or even against the U.S.
Dollar or the Japanese Yen.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly reviews the literature on fiscal ad-
justments. Section 3 discusses the theoretical mechanisms by which a depreciation of the
exchange rate makes a fiscal adjustment successful. Section 4 characterizes successful and
unsuccessful fiscal adjustments and tests a model that encompasses all the determinants of
success suggested by the literature, including monetary policy and exchange rate policies.
Section 5 discusses the implications of our results for the EMU and concludes.
2 Previous Work
A fiscal adjustment is a sizable improvement in the government primary surplus relative
to GDP. It can result from a reduction in government outlays, an increase in tax revenues
or both. Keynesian models predict that a deficit-financed increase in government spending
is expansionary for output, notwithstanding some crowding out of private investment due
to higher interest rates. Government spending stimulates demand and raises production
in an economy with some unemployment. On the other hand, an increase in taxes with
unchanged public spending reduces disposable income, thereby lowering private consumption
and interest rates. Investment may increase, but the overall effect on output is typically
negative in such models.
Models with infinitely lived agents have different predictions for the effects of fiscal pol-
icy. A reduction in government outlays raises permanent income because current and/or
future taxes are lower, thereby raising private consumption. Changes in taxes that are not
accompanied by changes in current or future public spending have no effects on private con-
sumption or investment: aggregate saving remains unchanged, as changes in public saving
lead to compensating changes in private saving. This is the well known Ricardian Equiva-
lence result, as in Barro (1974). Ricardian Equivalence, however, holds only in a world where
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taxes are nondistortionary, individuals are not credit constrained and there is no uncertainty
about future government policies. If current changes in taxes signal future changes in public
spending, as suggested by Feldstein (1982), the temporal pattern of taxes has real effects on
the economy.
In overlapping-generation models of finitely lived individuals, the timing of taxation is
important to determine the real effects of fiscal policy even when taxes are nondistortionary.
Cuts in public spending raise private consumption only if matched by cuts in taxes; changes
in current taxes affect private consumption, whether accompanied or not by changes in public
spending.
A different class of models proposes that the effects of fiscal policy on output and private
consumption are nonlinear and depend on the circumstances of adjustment. Blanchard
(1990) presents a model where the level of public debt matters. An increase in net taxes
lowers private consumption if public debt is low, but may raise private consumption if public
debt is high. This happens because higher current taxes delay the date of the adjustment,
postponing its deadweight cost to future generations. As a result, the lifetime income of
existing households and their consumption increase.
Sutherland (1997) proposes a similar mechanism. If an adjustment is expected when
public debt reaches a certain threshold, an increase in taxes when the economy is closer to
the threshold delays the adjustment and may increase the lifetime wealth of finite-horizon
households.
In Perotti (1999), some households are liquidity constrained. Higher budget surpluses
stemming from higher taxes reduce the consumption of liquidity-constrained households;
at the same time, higher budget surpluses stemming from lower public spending increase
the consumption of unconstrained households. Which effect dominates depends on the
tax/spending composition of the fiscal adjustment and on the level of public debt; when
the debt-to-GDP ratio is high, the positive effect on consumption dominates.
Other authors have pointed to the possibility of nonlinear effects of public spending cuts.
Feldstein (1982) and Drazen (1990) argue that small cuts in public spending have Keynesian
effects, while large cuts signal a change in regime and thus lead to increases in private
consumption. Bertola and Drazen (1993) propose a model where the relationship between
private and public consumption is nonlinear because agents expect a fiscal stabilization once
public spending reaches a predetermined threshold. An increase in public consumption when
it is close to the threshold makes the stabilization more likely and, as a result, it may increase
private consumption.
Giavazzi and Pagano (1990, 1996) started an exciting literature that aims to test em-
pirically the effects of fiscal stabilization. They analyze the Danish stabilization of 1983-86
and the Irish stabilization of 1987-89 to conclude that these fiscal adjustments did in fact
lead to an upward revision of estimates of permanent income and an increase in private
consumption. Giavazzi et al. (2000) find that non-Keynesian responses of national saving
to fiscal policy are associated to large and persistent fiscal impulses, especially during fiscal
contractions. As for other determinants of non-Keynesian response, they show that a high
or rapidly growing debt-to-GDP ratio as well as the composition of the fiscal adjustment
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fails to predict a non-Keynesian response to fiscal adjustments.
Alesina and Perotti (1995), Alesina et al. (1998) and Alesina and Ardagna (1998) classify
fiscal adjustments on the basis of their ex-post performance: adjustments are successful if,
three years after their implementation, the debt-to-GDP ratio has fallen at least 5 percentage
points. They find that composition matters: cutting spending rather than raising taxes leads
to more persistent improvements of public finances and is usually accompanied by an increase
in GDP.2
3 Theoretical Mechanism
The literature on fiscal adjustments was first motivated by the study of specific fiscal episodes
in small open economies such as Ireland, Denmark and Sweden. Giavazzi and Pagano (1990)
find those fiscal retrenchments to be expansionary and Alesina and Perotti (1995) point to
them as successful in the sense of having a long-lasting effect on public finances. Interestingly,
those adjustments were preceded by large devaluations of the exchange rate against the
nominal anchor, which at that time was the German DM, as remarked by Giavazzi and
Pagano (1990).
Ireland’s successful consolidations in 1983-84 and 1987-89 were preceded by 16 and 15
percentage points devaluations of the Punt that generated large gains in competitiveness - see
Figure 1. The unsuccessful 1996 adjustment, however, was preceded only by a 3 percentage-
point devaluation of the Punt relative to the German DM that, coupled with a positive
inflation differential relative to Germany, generated a 4 percentage-point appreciation of the
Irish real effective exchange rate and a fall in its competitiveness. Sweden’s successful adjust-
ments in 1983-87 and 1994-96 were preceded by 38 and 25 percentage points devaluations,
respectively, of the Swedish Krona relative to the German DM that led to large gains in
competitiveness - see Figure 2.
Why may depreciations facilitate the persistence of fiscal consolidations? We suggest a
number of different mechanisms at work. The first is that nominal exchange rate depre-
ciations (or devaluations), especially when combined with fiscal adjustments, lead to com-
petitiveness gains that generate export-lead economic expansions. Consider first the case of
a country that has adopted a fixed exchange rate regime. If prices do not adjust instan-
taneously, exchange rate devaluation leads to real exchange rate depreciation in the short
run. More precisely, the devaluation makes domestic goods cheaper relative to the foreign
goods, shifting demand away from foreign to domestic goods. This increase in aggregate
demand for domestic goods raises output and consumption and improves the trade balance -
see for example Obstfeld and Rogoff (1996, Chapter 10). The same forces are at work under
a flexible exchange rate regime. A monetary expansion makes the nominal exchange rate
depreciate in the short run, possibly even more than in the long run, while prices adjust more
2Tavares (2004) presents evidence that it is the interaction of the ideological bent of the cabinet and the
composition of the fiscal adjustment that matters: Spending cuts by left-wing cabinets and tax increases by
right-wing cabinets have the most impact on persistence.
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Figure 1: Irish Real Effective Exchange Rate (quarterly)
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Figure 2: Swedish Real Effective Exchange Rate (quarterly)
Note: shaded areas are periods of fiscal adjustment. A decrease in the real effective exchange rate corresponds
to a depreciation, i.e. an increase in competitiveness.
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slowly. As a result, domestic goods become cheaper than foreign goods in the short run,
output and consumption increase and the trade balance improves. Therefore, the economic
model we have in mind is one where a nominal exchange rate devaluation (or depreciation)
has short run expansionary effects on output and consumption.
If the nominal exchange rate devaluation is accompanied by a credible switch in policy
consistent with lower long-run inflation, the expansionary effect is amplified as domestic
prices will adjust by less. A severe fiscal contraction leads to lower expected long-run inflation
because it reduces the danger of future monetization of public debt. This was the case for
Ireland and Denmark in the 1980s, where large fiscal consolidations enhanced the long-run
credibility of their pegs to a low-inflation currency, the German DM. The amplification of the
expansionary effect stemming from lower long-run inflation may explain why depreciations
are expansionary in our sample of successful fiscal adjustments while the overall evidence
that devaluations and depreciations are expansionary is mixed – see for example Edwards
(1986) and Agenor and Montiel (1999).
An economic expansion affects the likelihood of success of a fiscal consolidation in a
number of ways. First, the automatic stabilizers tend to raise government surplus as GDP
grows faster. Second, an expansionary fiscal adjustment is more likely to be continued for
political-economy reasons as the government is likely to be reelected and the fiscal program
not to be reversed.
The theoretical mechanism above indicates that exchange rate rather than money supply
is important for successful fiscal stabilizations. The money supply rises during an expan-
sionary fiscal stabilization in response to an increase in the demand of real balances, but it
also rises after failed inflation stabilization. Our theoretical mechanism also suggests that
the empirical analysis should focus on the real effective exchange rate, which better captures
competitiveness gains than the nominal exchange rate.
The mechanism highlighted above is consistent with the data. Successful adjustments
are preceded by depreciations, as shown in Section 4. A simple statistical analysis of the
fiscal episodes in our sample3 indicates that real GDP growth and investment as percent of
GDP accelerate and the current account improves during a successful adjustment.
If countries have foreign-denominated external debt, servicing the debt becomes more
onerous after devaluation. This may be the second mechanism at work, as higher interest
payments on the existing stock of debt force countries to run primary surpluses, as they
would otherwise be unable to repay their external debt and face the consequences of default.
The fiscal episodes in our samples are characterized by low foreign-denominated levels of
external debt. Over the period 1980 to 2002, foreign-denominated public external debt was
on average 5.5 percent of GDP in our OECD sample, while public debt was on average 63
percent of GDP. Hence, a mere 8 percent of government debt was issued in foreign currency.
Even small open economies such as Ireland, Denmark and Sweden had relatively little foreign-
denominated government debt during their episodes of fiscal adjustments, respectively 10,
3A panel regression with fixed effects of several macroeconomic variables of interest on their own lagged
value and dummies for the two years before, during and the two years after successful and non-successful
adjustments. The results of this regression are available from the authors.
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13 and 13 percent of GDP. So while the denomination of external debt may contribute to
the success of a fiscal adjustment successful, we believe that in practice this channel does
not play an important role in our OECD sample.
4 Empirics
This section assesses the role of changes in exchange rate and the money supply on the
persistence of fiscal adjustments. We analyze the impact of monetary and exchange rate
policies taking into account the determinants of successful adjustments previously studied in
the literature. We use data on fiscal, monetary and output indicators for 20 OECD economies
between the years 1970 and 1999.4 Fiscal and output data are from the OECD Economic
Outlook; a shorter sample of these data has been widely used in the empirical literature on
fiscal adjustments. As to the data on the money supply, we have obtained them from the
International Monetary Fund’s International Financial Statistics. In Appendix A we provide
a description of the data series, including units and sources.
A period of fiscal adjustment is a year for which the primary deficit is cut by at least
1.5 percent of GDP, a rather stringent definition as has been pointed out in the literature.5
To assess this threshold, and as an illustration, we have verified that the sustained output
expansion in the 1990s in the United States, which has led to a marked decrease in the budget
deficit, does not display a single year that qualifies as an “adjustment year” according to
our criterion. We then subdivide adjustment years into successful and unsuccessful, where a
fiscal adjustment is successful when the average change in the primary deficit-to-GDP ratio
is less or equal to zero in the three (or, alternatively, two) years following the year the deficit
was cut. All other cases are classified as unsuccessful adjustments.6 Appendix B defines our
variables and how they are calculated.
We allow for overlapping episodes and treat each and every year of change in the primary
deficit-to-GDP ratio less than or equal to -1.5 percent as an adjustment. The years before
and after any year of adjustment are considered as such, irrespective of whether they are also
classified as periods of fiscal adjustment. In this way we are not required to choose which
4The countries are Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece,
Japan, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom and
the United States.
5We use 1.5 percent of GDP as the threshold to define a fiscal adjustment year for several reasons. First,
this is the benchmark in most empirical papers in this research area and one of the objectives of our paper
is to provide new results on the role of monetary and exchange rate policy that are directly comparable
to those in the existing literature. Second, the 1.5 percentage-point threshold captures the most important
episodes of adjustment originating from truly discretionary changes in fiscal policy. A 1 percent-of-GDP
threshold would likely pick up cyclically-driven fiscal improvement while a 2 percent-of-GDP threshold is
too demanding and drastically reduces the number of adjustment episodes. However, we verified that the
use of both the 1 and 2 percent-of-GDP thresholds delivers qualitatively similar results.
6This definition of success is also widely used in the empirical literature on adjustments and its aim is
to capture the persistence of the adjustment. It focuses on adjustments that are not quickly reversed and
bring a persistent improvement to public finances.
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episodes to include and which to leave out. In our sample there are 99 fiscal adjustments, of
which 50 are successful according to our two-year definition and 47 are successful according
to our three-year definition.
Since our theoretical mechanism suggests that competitiveness affects the likelihood of
success of a fiscal adjustment, we use effective exchange rates in our estimations. The
nominal effective exchange rate measures competitiveness but does not account directly for
the dynamics of prices. If prices adjust quickly, as is the case in high-inflation countries,
the nominal effective exchange rate may be an inappropriate measure of competitiveness.
This is not a problem in our sample that consists of OECD countries with low inflation.
The real effective exchange rate adjusts for inflation and therefore measures competitiveness
more appropriately than the nominal effective exchange rate. However, it already captures
the role of monetary policy and inflation. This is problematic when we want to run a horse
race between monetary and exchange rate policies. To deal with these problems, we present
the results using both the nominal and the real effective exchange rate.
Next we provide empirical estimates of the impact of exchange rate changes as well as
other macroeconomic indicators on the persistence of fiscal adjustments. We are able to
quantify the relative importance of each variable as a determinant of success. We use a
panel Probit specification for the sample of adjustments. The dependent variable to be
explained is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 in case of success and 0 otherwise.7
Table 1 presents summary statistics on changes in monetary and exchange rate policy
variables around the date of adjustment. We present estimates from random-effects panel
data regressions of each variable on its lagged value and on dummy indicators for the two
years before, during and the two years after fiscal adjustments. The -2.64 significant coeffi-
cient on the nominal effective exchange rate tells us that there is a significant depreciation
before successful adjustments. In the third column we uncover evidence that the real effective
exchange rate depreciates on average by 3.86 percent before a successful fiscal adjustment
and this depreciation is statistically significant. As to monetary policy, the significant coeffi-
cient of 2.69 is evidence that the money supply increases in the two years before unsuccessful
adjustments. A different issue is whether these changes in effective exchange rates and money
supply actually contribute to success in fiscal adjustments. This is assessed later in Tables
2 and 3, which suggest that only changes in the exchange rate contribute significantly to
persistence of fiscal adjustments.
The results show that before and during successful adjustments there are depreciations
of the exchange rate (or devaluations, for the case of fixed exchange rate regimes). This
result emerges with both the nominal and real effective exchange rate. Quantitatively, the
coefficients suggest that the average nominal depreciation is 2.69 percentage points while
the average real depreciation is 3.86 percentage points before a successful adjustment. In
contrast, there is not a similar regularity as to changes in monetary policy before successful
adjustments. If anything, an increase in the money supply before an adjustment is associated
with a smaller likelihood of success.
As we pointed out earlier, previous works have identified different characteristics of fiscal
7See Appendix B for a precise three- and two-year definition of success.
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Timing Effective Exchange Rate Money
Nominal Real Supply
Before Successful -2.64** -3.86** -1.70
Adjustments (-3.22) (-2.39) (-0.95)
During Successful -1.99** -0.62 -0.58
Adjustments (-2.41) (-0.35) (-0.31)
After Successful 2.06** 1.45 -0.01
Adjustments (2.59) (1.05) (-0.01)
Before Unsuccessful -0.54 -0.74 2.69*
Adjustments (-0.77) (-0.46) (1.74)
During Unsuccessful -0.25 0.63 -1.22
Adjustments (-0.32) (0.36) (-0.72)
After Unsuccessful -1.16* -0.26 0.73
Adjustments (-1.68) (-0.15) (0.48)
R2 Overall 0.04 0.05 0.01
No. of Observations 752 384 680
Note: This table presents random-effects panel data estimates of the average sample be-
havior of the effective exchange rate and of the money supply in the two years before,
during and the two years after successful and unsuccessful adjustments. The t− statistic
is presented in parenthesis below the coefficient. A positive change in the exchange rate
denotes an appreciation. * and ** indicate a significant coefficient atthe 10 and the 5 per-
cent confidence level, respectively.
Table 1: Exchange Rate, Money Supply and Fiscal Adjustments: Random Effects
adjustments that may be associated with high persistence: the size of the adjustment, as in
Giavazzi and Pagano (1990; 1996); the composition of the fiscal adjustment, as in Alesina
and Perotti (1995), Alesina et al. (1998) and Alesina and Ardagna (1998); “good” and “bad”
times, i.e. a high debt-to-GDP ratio or low economic growth, as in Perotti (1999) and
Giavazzi et al. (2000). We use the literature to guide our specification and test for the role
of exchange rates and monetary policy in determining success. Our benchmark specification
is thus:
Success(t) = Φ(β1 ∗ Level of Public Debt(t− 1)
+β2 ∗ Real GDP growth(t− 1)
+β3 ∗ Change in Public Deficit(t)
+β4 ∗ Change in Government Consumption(t)
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+β5 ∗ Change in M1 Money Supply(t− 1, t− 2)
+β6 ∗ Change in the Exchange Rate(t− 1, t− 2))
where (t) refers to the time period, (t−1) to the lagged value and (t−1, t−2) to the average
lagged value in periods t − 1 and t − 2. Our variables of interest are the changes in the
exchange rate and in M1 in the years preceding the adjustment. The control variables are:8
• Level of Public Debt (t − 1), i.e. Government Net Financial Liabilities as percent of
GDP in the year preceding the adjustment;
• Real GDP growth (t − 1), i.e. the rate of growth in real GDP the year before the
adjustment;9
• Change in Public Deficit (t), i.e. the contemporaneous change in the public deficit,
corrected for the cycle;
• Change in Government Consumption (t), i.e. the contemporaneous change in govern-
ment consumption.
Table 2 and Table 3 use the whole sample of adjustments to identify the strongest pre-
dictors of success in fiscal adjustment for different definitions of success. Table 2 reports
the results for the nominal effective exchange rate; Table 3 reports the results for the real
effective exchange rate.10 Columns (1) through (4) add, in turn, each of the determinants
of successful adjustment as suggested by the literature to the lagged change in the money
supply and in the effective exchange rate. The coefficient of the lagged change in the ex-
change rate is always significant and negative, suggesting that a devaluation/depreciation in
the effective exchange rate in the two years before the adjustment raises the probability of
success. In contrast, the money supply does not affect the likelihood of success. As to the
control variables, only the size and the composition of the adjustment matter for the persis-
tence of the adjustment. Thus, more severe cuts concentrated on decreases in government
consumption rather than increases in tax revenues favor success. These results are robust to
using the three- or the two-year definition of success.
The regression including all control variables in Table 2 suggests that a one standard-
deviation increase of the change in the nominal effective exchange rate raises the probability
of success by 2 percentage points.11 This effect is significant but quantitatively small. It
8The control variables are described in Appendix A.
9The inclusion of real GDP growth also corrects for the phase of the business cycle at the time of the
fiscal adjustment. Nevertheless, our results do not change when this variable is omitted.
10In Tables 2 to 5 we estimate a maximum-likelihood Probit specification and use the dprobit instruction
which, rather than coefficients, reports the change in the probability for an infinitesimal change in the
independent variable (or, if the control variable is a dummy variable, a change from 0 to 1 in this variable).
The change in the probability for an infinitesimal change in the control variable is evaluated taking the other
control variables at the sample mean.
11This figure is obtained by multiplying the coefficient of Table 2 by the standard deviation of the nominal
effective exchange rate in our sample. Table 6 in Appendix C reports the standard deviation of selected
variables.
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3-Year Success 2-Year Success
Lagged Debt 0.051 0.0046 -0.0074
(1.61) (0.31) (-0.54)
Lagged Real GDP growth -0.0085** -0.0041 -0.0027
(2.12) (-1.31) (-0.97)
Change in Deficit -0.0338** -0.0190** -0.0206**
(-2.96) (-3.32) (-3.53)
Change in Government -8.52** -6.5992** -7.0915**
Consumption (-6.71) (-4.64) (-5.03)
Lagged Change in the -0.011** -0.0092** -0.0055** -0.0053** -0.0034** -0.0022**
Exchange Rate (-4.81) (-5.05) (-2.88) (-3.94) (-2.72) (-1.82)
Lagged Change in M1 -0.0024 -0.0013 -0.0016 -0.0007 -0.0008 -0.0009
(-1.32) (-1.21) (-1.22) (-0.97) (-1.17) (-1.45)
Pseudo R2 0.11 0.12 0.24 0.25 0.37 0.43
No. of Observations 460 580 466 530 421 421
Note: The coefficient is interpreted as the percentage change in the dependent variable (success of the fiscal adjustment) for a one
percent change in the independent variable. The Lagged Change in Exchange Rate and the Lagged Change in M1 are, respectively,
the change in the exchange rate (a positive value denotes an appreciation) and in M1 in the two years before the adjustment. The
control variables are described in Appendix A. The t− statistic is presented in parenthesis below the coefficient. * and ** indicate
a significant coefficient at the 10 and the 5 percent confidence level, respectively.
Table 2: Exchange Rates and Fiscal Adjustments: Nominal Effective Exchange Rates
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3-Year Success 2-Year Success
Lagged Debt 0.0492 0.0050 -0.0143
(1.36) (0.33) (-0.90)
Lagged GDP growth -0.0112 -0.0044 -0.0028
(-1.58) (-1.08) (-0.77)
Change in Deficit -0.0343** -0.0261** -0.0317**
(-4.73) (-4.93) (-5.91)
Change in Government -9.5420** -4.0497** -3.7794**
Consumption (-4.35) (-2.41) (-2.43)
Lagged Change in the -0.0089** -0.0081** -0.0038** -0.0043** -0.0022** -0.0016*
Exchange Rate (-3.40) (-3.43) (-3.09) (-2.60) (-2.36) (-1.92)
Lagged Change in M1 -0.0004 -0.0007 -0.0002 -0.0008 -0.0005 -0.0008
(-0.33) (-0.66) (-0.28) (-0.77) (-0.76) (-1.41)
Pseudo R2 0.08 0.09 0.35 0.18 0.40 0.47
No. of Observations 322 334 337 352 312 312
Note: The coefficient is interpreted as the percentage change in the dependent variable (success of the fiscal adjustment) for a one
percent change in the independent variable. The Lagged Change in Exchange Rate and the Lagged Change in M1 are, respectively,
the change in the exchange rate (a positive value denotes an appreciation) and in M1 in the two years before the adjustment. The
control variables are described in Appendix A. The t− statistic is presented in parenthesis below the coefficient. * and ** indicate
a significant coefficient at the 10 and the 5 percent confidence level, respectively.
Table 3: Exchange Rates and Fiscal Adjustments: Real Effective Exchange Rates
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points to the fact that exchange rate movements are a small determinant of success in
practice. However, the quantitative effect of change in the exchange rate is comparable to
that of the other determinants of success. A one standard-deviation increase in the size and
composition of the fiscal adjustment raise the probability of success by 3 and 4 percentage
points, respectively. The effects suggested by the coefficients in Table 3 are quantitatively
similar.
We interpret the findings of Table 2 and Table 3 as evidence that a depreciation before
the fiscal adjustment, as well as an increase in the size and composition of the fiscal consoli-
dation, raises the probability of success. A causal interpretation of the relationship between
exchange rates and the probability of success needs caveats. If the fiscal adjustment ex-post
causes the depreciation of the exchange rate, our empirical estimates should be interpreted
as documenting a correlation among the two variables. This would be the case if the govern-
ment’s decision to devalue/depreciate the exchange rate is caused by its decision to carry out
a fiscal adjustment in the future. We do not believe this is typically case in our sample. The
study of specific fiscal episodes in small open economies suggests that the decision to devalue
the exchange rate was often taken by the central bank independently of the Treasury. In
other cases, the devaluation and the fiscal adjustment were undertaken by different cabinets.
An important issue is whether the countries analyzed were under a fixed or a flexible
exchange rate regime and how this matters. Table 4 and Table 5 interact an indicator
of the exchange rate regime with changes in the exchange rate and in the money supply,
respectively. The interaction variables help us identify whether it is the money supply or
exchange rate changes that matter according to the policy regime. We classify each country
at each point in time as a Fixer or a Nonfixer based on the IMF’s Classification of Exchange
Rate Arrangements and Monetary Policy Frameworks detailed in Appendix A. Countries
classified by the IMF as pursuing an independent float policy are classified as Non-Fixers and
all others - independently of the type of peg or band restricting exchange rate movements -
are classified as Fixers.12 Calvo and Reinhart (2000) point out that the IMF’s Classification
of Exchange Rate Regimes does not provide an adequate representation of what countries
actually do, as many countries that claim to float their exchange rate in reality do not.
Reinhart and Rogoff (2004) and Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2005) suggest alternative
exchange rate regime classifications. Because our sample includes only OECD economies
and because we choose to classify as Non-Fixers only those countries classified by the IMF
as independently floating, i.e. the United States, Japan, Australia, Canada and, at intervals,
the United Kingdom, our classification is very similar to these alternative ones.13
12The IMF’s Classification of Exchange Rate Arrangements and Monetary Policy Frameworks defines an
independent float as follows: “The exchange rate is market-determined, with any official foreign exchange
market intervention aimed at moderating the rate of change and preventing undue fluctuations in the ex-
change rate, rather than at establishing a level for it.”
13Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2005) suggest a de-facto classification based on the actual behavior of
macroeconomic variables. Their classification differs from ours only in a few years for Canada and the
United Kingdom and these years are not fiscal adjustments anyway. Reinhart and Rogoff (2004) present an
alternative classification that uses data on market-determined parallel exchange rates. Their classification
overlaps the most with the IMF’s classification of the G3 currencies and of the limited flexibility European
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3-Year Success 2-Year Success
Nominal Real Nominal Real
Lagged Debt 0.00112 0.0056 -0.00355 -0.0096
(0.72) (0.39) (-0.25) (-0.79)
Lagged Real GDP growth -0.0042 -0.0038 -0.00240 -0.0007
(-1.28) (-0.99) (-0.88) (-0.24)
Change in Deficit -0.0202** -0.0247** -0.0227** -0.0249**
(-3.52) (-4.76) (-3.62) (-5.45)
Change in Government -6.472** -3.74** -6.920** -2.62**
Consumption (-4.53) (-2.61) (-4.68) (-2.37)
Lagged Change in the -0.0046* -0.0018 -0.00423** -0.0020
Exchange Rate: Fixers (-1.74) (-1.03) (-2.21) (-1.47)
Lagged Change in the -0.0026* -0.0019** -0.00136 -0.0005
Exchange Rate: Non-Fixers (-1.85) (-2.03) (-0.84) (-0.73)
Lagged Change in M1: -0.00084 -0.0011 -0.000253 -0.0018**
Fixers (-0.98) (-2.06) (-0.26) (-2.06)
Lagged Change in M1: -0.00038 -0.0001 -0.000295 -0.0003
Non-Fixers (-0.46) (-0.18) (-0.40) (-0.60)
Pseudo R2 0.37 0.41 0.43 0.48
No. of Observations 420 313 420 313
Note: The coefficient is interpreted as the percentage change in the dependent variable (suc-
cess of the fiscal adjustment) for a one percent change in the independent variable. The
Lagged Change in the Exchange Rate and the Lagged Change in M1 are, respectively, the
change in the exchange rate (a positive value de-notes an appreciation) and in M1 in the two
years before the adjustment. The control variables are described in Appendix A. The mone-
tary and exchange rate variables are interacted with dummy variables forfixed and flexible
exchange rate regimes. The t− statistic is presented in parentheses below the coefficient. *
and ** indicate a significant coefficient at the 10 and the 5 percent confidence levels, respec-
tively.
Table 4: Exchange Rates and Fiscal Adjustments: Nominal Effective Exchange Rate and
Fixers versus Non-Fixers
We classify as Non-Fixers countries that do not use the exchange rate as a policy variable
and then test if monetary policy variables are significant in making fiscal adjustments suc-
cessful in such countries. If monetary policy matters for success, this should certainly be the
arrangements, which are the countries in our sample.
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3-Year Success 2-Year Success
Lagged Debt 0.0093 0.0057 0.0056 -0.0058 -0.0138 -0.0096
(0.60) (0.36) (0.39) (-0.40) (-0.82) (-0.79)
Lagged Real GDP growth -0.0054 -0.0042 -0.0038 -0.0034 -0.0009 -0.0007
(-1.54) (-1.00) (-0.99) (-1.24) (-0.22) (-0.24)
Change in Deficit -0.0233** -0.0284** -0.0247** -0.0242** -0.0381** -0.0249**
(-4.12) (-4.95) (-4.76) (-3.95) (-6.01) (-5.95)
Change in Government -7.0467** -3.9650** -3.7403** -7.3631** -2.9741* -2.6246**
Consumption (-4.56) (-2.47) (-2.61) (-4.90) (-1.88) (-2.37)
Lagged Change in the -0.0024 -0.0018 -0.0040** -0.0020
Exchange Rate: Fixers (-1.34) (-1.03) (-2.13) (-1.47)
Lagged Change in the -0.0022** -0.0019** -0.0011 -0.0005
Exchange Rate: Non-Fixers (-2.01) (-2.03) (-0.94) (-0.73)
Lagged Change in M1: -0.0008 -0.0011 -0.0002 -0.0018**
Fixers (-0.92) (-1.06) (-0.20) (-2.06)
Lagged Change in M1: 0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0003
Non-Fixers (0.14) (-0.18) (-0.13) (-0.60)
Pseudo R2 0.35 0.39 0.41 0.41 0.44 0.48
No. of Observations 420 323 313 420 323 313
Note: The coefficient is interpreted as the percentage change in the dependent variable (success of the fiscal adjustment) for a one
percent change in the independent variable. The Lagged Change in the Exchange Rate and the Lagged Change in M1 are, respec-
tively, the change in the exchange rate (a positive value denotes an appreciation) and in M1 in the two years before the adjustment.
The control variables are described in Appendix A. The monetary and exchange rate variables are interacted with dummy variables
for fixed and flexible exchange rate regimes. The t− statistic is presented in parentheses below the coefficient. * and ** indicate a
significant coefficient at the 10 and the 5 percent confidence levels, respectively.
Table 5: Exchange Rates and Fiscal Adjustments: Real Effective Exchange Rate and Fixers versus Non-Fixers
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case among countries that independently float their exchange rates, namely the Non-Fixers.
Hence, it is our deliberate choice to exclude intermediate regimes from our set definition of
Non-Fixers and, therefore, to bias our results in favor of monetary policy.
The results in Table 4 and Table 5 suggest that it is changes in the effective exchange rate
that favor the persistence of a fiscal adjustment. Table 4 shows the results of our test for the
nominal and real effective exchange rates. When both the money supply and the nominal
effective exchange rate are interacted with the exchange rate regime, only the change in the
exchange rate comes out as significant and with the correct, negative sign for both Fixers and
Non-Fixers under the three-year definition of success. For the two-year definition of success,
the nominal effective exchange rate is significant for Fixers. The real effective exchange
rate is significant and with the expected negative sign for Non-Fixers when the three-year
definition of success is used. The money supply is not significant except for Fixers in the
two-year definition of success, with the sign suggesting that loosening the money supply
before the adjustment decreases the likelihood of success.
The results of Table 4 suggest that monetary policy does not improve the likelihood of
persistence of the fiscal adjustment. Changes in the nominal effective exchange rate improve
the probability of success while the results for changes in the real effective exchange rate
are mixed. One explanation for the mixed performance of the real effective exchange rate is
that it captures both changes in the nominal effective exchange rate and in inflation, which
is closely related to changes in M1. In other words, changes in the real effective exchange
rate capture both exchange rate and monetary policies. As a result, it is problematic to run
a horse-race between the two policies using the real effective exchange rate. We interpret
the mixed results in using the real effective exchange rate as a result of this problem.
To better understand the behavior of the real exchange rate described in Table 4, in Table
5 we add the interacted the real effective exchange rate and the interacted money supply in
sequence. The third and sixth columns reproduce some of the results in Table 4. When only
changes in the money supply are considered as regressors, there is no significant effect of the
former on the persistence of adjustment, irrespective of the definition of success considered
and the exchange rate regime. This is the most important result in Table 5. The lagged
change in the real effective exchange rate comes out as significant when entered in isolation
for Non-Fixers in the three-year definition and for Fixers in the two-year definition. When
both the money supply and the real effective exchange rate are interacted with the exchange
rate regime, the change in the real exchange rate comes out as significant in the three-year
definition of success for Non-Fixers, confirming our intuition.
The magnitudes of the effects on the likelihood of success suggested by Table 4 and Table
5 are quantitatively similar to those of Table 2 and Table 3. The caveats concerning a causal
interpretation of our findings still apply.
In sum, the effective exchange rate helps success when undergoing a fiscal adjustment.14
These results are consistent with Lane and Perotti (1998), who present empirical evidence
14Earlier versions of this paper presented different specifications using alternative real exchange rate vari-
ables, such as the real exchange rate versus the German DM and the U.S. Dollar. These specifications
revealed a similar qualitative pattern.
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that a fiscal adjustment is associated with an expansion of exports and the effect is “reinforced
if the fiscal reform is accompanied by a flexible exchange rate [system] or a devaluation.”
Our econometric tests deliver a clear message: as suggested in the empirical and theo-
retical literature surveyed above, the size and the composition of the fiscal adjustment are
key to its persistence; depreciation of the domestic currency also facilitates the success of
the fiscal adjustment irrespectively of the exchange rate regime in place; the money supply
does not appear to consistently influence the persistence of the fiscal adjustment.
Our results on the exchange rate test, for the first time, the contention often made
in the literature that successful fiscal adjustments tend to be preceded by exchange rate
depreciations. This contention has been alluded to by several authors but previously it had
never been tested explicitly. Giavazzi and Pagano (1990) mention: “several major multi-year
fiscal adjustments are preceded by a devaluation of the exchange rate.” Alesina and Perotti
(1997) find that, though there are significant exchange rate depreciations before all type of
adjustments, the average depreciation before and during successful adjustments are twice as
high. These authors also find, consistent with our findings and interpretation, that there
is a significant positive increase in the trade balance only during successful adjustments,
suggesting a surge in exports.15
5 Conclusions and Implications for the EMU
The empirical literature on the determinants of successful fiscal adjustments has overlooked
the role of monetary and exchange rate policies. Our paper presents new empirical estimates
highlight and assess the importance of monetary and exchange rate policies.
Successful fiscal adjustments in the OECD during last three decades have typically been
preceded by large nominal and real exchange rate depreciations. We believe that exchange
rate depreciation improves the likelihood of success of fiscal adjustments by improving com-
petitiveness and boosting economic activity that, in turn, improves budget surpluses and
makes it more likely for the adjustment program to be continued. Exchange rate deprecia-
tions are significant in predicting success for fiscal adjustments. A one standard-deviation
increase in the rate of depreciation of the nominal effective exchange rate in the two years
before a fiscal adjustment increases the probability of success by 2 percentage points. The
size and composition of the deficit cut, namely the spending-tax revenues composition of the
fiscal adjustment, are also significant: a one standard-deviation increase raises the probabil-
ity of success by 4 and 3 percentage points, respectively. In contrast, monetary policy does
not play a significant role in successful adjustments.
The EMU has substantially altered the conduct of exchange rate and monetary policies
by creating a common currency and the European Central Bank. The institutional setting
15See Table 10 in Alesina and Perotti (1997). The authors mention: “both successful and unsuccessful
adjustments have been accompanied and preceded by nominal depreciations, somewhat larger in successful
cases. However, significant depreciations accompanied unsuccessful adjustments as well. What is interesting
is that while in successful cases the nominal depreciations had an impact on competitiveness (unit labor
costs) in unsuccessful cases it did not.”
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is now characterized by centralization of monetary policy while, in the fiscal sphere, national
autonomy is kept within the constraints dictated by the Pact for Stability and Growth that
accompany the monetary agreement.16 The combination of centralized monetary and decen-
tralized, though constrained, fiscal policy raises two different questions. The first question
is whether countries are more or less likely to incur budget deficits in a monetary union. On
one hand, the loss of monetary autonomy may increase the use of fiscal policy to respond
to asymmetric shocks. On the other hand, both factor- and product-market integration and
the statutory limits dictated by the Stability Pact effectively limit fiscal autonomy. Govern-
ments are likely to be constrained by the diminished capacity to raise taxes due to increasing
factor (mainly capital) mobility. In the past, governments in Europe have been able to place
a substantial part of their debt with their private banks; this situation may change in the
future. Moreover, lower seignorage revenues harden the fiscal budget constraint on the fiscal
authority, even though such revenues are typically small in OECD economies.
The second question, and the one for which our results are relevant, is whether EMU
members with excessive deficits are in a better position to correct them after adhering to
the EMU. Our paper suggests they are not. Our results show that currency depreciation
furthers the likelihood of successful, i.e. persistent, fiscal adjustments. Given that the EMU
introduced a single currency for all its members and that EMU members trade mostly with
each other, it may now be harder for individual countries to correct fiscal imbalances.
Previous evidence by other authors reinforces our case that fiscal adjustments will be
harder to undertake under the EMU. Eichengreen and Wyplosz (1998) look at the major
recession in OECD countries and find seven instances of countries with deficits in excess of
3 percent of GDP in the period 1955-96. By examining the growth rate of GDP and the
behavior of the budget deficit, they indicate that these are “snap” recessions in that real
GDP growth is negative only for the year of recession and positive in all years immediately
before and after. In contrast, the budget deficit increases dramatically in the recession year
and stays at values higher than 3 percent of GDP for at least 3 years thereafter. This
suggests that, even though instances of exceeding the EMU deficit limits will be rare, once
they occur, they are likely to require large discretionary fiscal policy measures. In this
context, the abandonment of the exchange rate as a policy instrument is likely to have a
significant impact on the persistence of the adjustment. Obstfeld (1999) points to another
reason why EMU countries will find it more difficult to undertake successful adjustments:
most recent adjustments within the EMU are not relying on spending cuts but rather on tax
increases (sometimes temporary) which may not be sustainable. In fact, even the European
Monetary Institute had expressed reservations about the persistence of the fiscal adjustments
undertaken in the build-up to the monetary union. Some EMU members have high public
debt-to-GDP ratios that require large interest rate payments and make the fiscal constraints
dictated by the Pact for Stability and Growth binding. The recent breach of the deficit limits
by France and Germany and the related tensions in the application of the EMU framework
are a clear indication of such problems. Our results suggest that a successful adjustment
16For an overview of the history and the political and economic rationale of monetary unification in Europe
see Eichengreen (1993).
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within the EMU is likely to be more costly as countries that abandon autonomous exchange
rate policies must rely entirely on the size and composition of its fiscal cuts to achieve
sustainable deficit reductions.
Appendix
A Data Sources
Real GDP growth Definition: Growth rate of real GDP, computed as the difference be-
tween the value in the current year minus the value one year before, divided by the
value the year before. Unit: Percentage points. Source: OECD Economic Outlook.
Nominal Effective Exchange Rate Definition: Growth rate of the nominal effective ex-
change rate, defined as the difference between the value in the current year minus the
value one year before, divided by the value the year before. A positive value denotes
an appreciation of the country’s currency. Unit: Percentage points. Source: OECD
Economic Outlook.
Real Effective Exchange Rate Definition: Growth rate of the real effective exchange
rate, defined as the difference between the value in the current year minus the value
one year before, divided by the value the year before. A positive value denotes an
appreciation of the country’s currency. The computation of the real effective exchange
rate is based on relative consumer prices and relative nominal unit labor costs. Unit:
Percentage points. Source: OECD Economic Outlook.
Lagged Change in the Exchange Rate Definition: Growth rate of the exchange rate in
the year before the current one, defined as the difference between the value in the year
before the current minus the value one year before, divided by the value the year before.
A positive value denotes an appreciation of the country’s currency. Unit: Percentage
points. Source: OECD Economic Outlook.
Exchange Rate Regime Definition: A Non-Fixer country is any country classified by
the International Monetary Fund under: “freely floating regime” (between 1970 and
1974), the exchange rate is not maintained in “relatively narrow bands” (between 1974
and 1978) or it is “independently floating” (after 1978). All other country-years are
considered Fixers. Source: International Monetary Fund, Classification of Exchange
Rate Arrangements and Monetary Policy Frameworks.
M1 Definition: Growth rate of M1 monetary aggregate computed as the difference between
the value in the current year minus the value one year before, divided by the value the
year before. Unit: Percentage points. Source: IMF International Financial Statistics.
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Inflation Definition: Growth rate of the Consumer Price Index computed as the difference
between the value in the current year minus the value one year before, divided by the
value the year before. Unit: Percentage points. Source: IMF International Financial
Statistics.
Lagged Debt Level Definition: Government Net Financial Liabilities as a Share of GDP
one year before the fiscal adjustment. Unit: Percentage points. Source: OECD Eco-
nomic Outlook.
Change in Deficit Definition: Total change in the public deficit as a share of GDP in the
year of fiscal adjustment, corrected for the cycle. A positive value indicates an increase
in the public deficit. Unit: Percentage points. Source: OECD Economic Outlook.
Change in Government Consumption Definition: Change in the level of government
consumption as a share of GDP in the year of the fiscal adjustment. Unit: Percentage
points. Source: OECD Economic Outlook.
B Definitions
Fiscal Adjustment A period of fiscal adjustment is a year for which the primary deficit
is reduced by at least 1.5 percent of GDP relative to the year before. Let D(t) be the
primary deficit-to-GDP ratio in year t. There is a fiscal adjustment in period t if
D(t)−D(t− 1) ≤ −0.015
Successful Fiscal adjustment, three years definition A fiscal adjustment is successful
when the average change in the primary deficit-to-GDP ratio is less than or equal to
zero in the three years following the year the deficit was cut. Let D(t) be the primary
deficit-to-GDP ratio in year t. The fiscal adjustment in period t is successful if
1
3
{[D(t+ 1)−D(t)] + [D(t+ 2)−D(t+ 1)] + [D(t+ 3)−D(t+ 2)]} ≤ 0.
This condition simplifies to
D(t+ 3) ≤ D(t).
Hence, we can alternatively say that the fiscal adjustment in period t is successful if
the primary deficit-to-GDP ratio in period t+3 is less than or equal to the the primary
deficit-to-GDP ratio in period t.
Successful Fiscal adjustment, two years definition A fiscal adjustment is successful
when the average change in the primary deficit-to-GDP ratio is less than or equal to
zero in the two years following the year the deficit was cut. Let D(t) be the primary
deficit-to-GDP ratio in year t. The fiscal adjustment in period t is successful if
1
2
{[D(t+ 1)−D(t)] + [D(t+ 2)−D(t+ 1)]} ≤ 0,
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which simplifies to
D(t+ 2) ≤ D(t).
The fiscal adjustment in period t is successful if the primary deficit-to-GDP ratio in
period t+ 2 is less than or equal to the the primary deficit-to-GDP ratio in period t.
C Summary Statistics
Variable Mean Standard
Deviation
Lagged Change in the Nominal Effective -0.4377 4.7695
Exchange Rate
Lagged Change in the Real Effective 0.2460 6.1648
Exchange Rate
Lagged Debt 30.3467 36.4824
Lagged Real GDP growth 3.4595 2.6680
Change in Deficit -0.0922 1.6908
Change in Government Consumption 0.0009 0.0063
Lagged Change in the Nominal Effective -0.0451 2.6301
Exchange Rate - Fixers
Lagged Change in the Nominal Effective -0.6570 4.2941
Exchange Rate - Non-Fixers
Lagged Change in the Real Effective -0.0472 3.7371
Exchange Rate - Fixers
Lagged Change in the Real Effective 0.2797 4.6974
Exchange Rate - Non-Fixers
Table 6: Mean and standard deviation of selected variables
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